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exercise of pmver, 
found fo1· 
has later entered the state 
T>VATI,O>'~U because 
he cannot pass the examination of a health off1eer or 
licensing board. 'l'he result is direct conflict of authority. 
Bithrr the is ineffrctive or the state must 
bow to the of its 
fundamPittal 
of the state." 
that eonf1 iet must be resolwrl in favor 
to the rc•ferences 
that 
addtrd.) 'l'he same comments apply 
in the instant construction contract and 
t th' building is to br construeted in com-
plianee with local 
The j is affirmed. 
Gibson, C . 
. J., and JYieComb, ,J., CUllCUrl'P(l 
A. Xo. :!4270. In Bank. Oct. 19, 
LOCAL 659, I.A.'r.S.E. Corporation), Appellant, v. 
COLOH CORPORATION OF A.MEIUCA, Hespondent. 
[1] Arbitration- Agreements to Arbitrate.~- Code Civ. Proe., 
§ 1280, declaring- that a provision in a written contract to 
settle arbitration a controversy out of the contract 
or refusal to the 1vhole or any part thereof "shall 
be valid, enforcible and save upon such as 
exist at law or in Pquity for tbe revocation of contract," 
indicates that there may be instances in which right to 
enforce an arbitration is lost. 
[2] !d.-Agreements to Arbitrate-Waiver.-An arbitration pro-
Yision of a contmet may he wnived either or both parties 
litigating the which would he arbitrable nnder thP 
& 1 il; Am.Jur., A 
McK. Dig. References: [l, 2, 7] Arbitration, 
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the question of such and 
to proceed to arbitrate in the manner and 
is a waiver of the to insist on 
arbitration as a defense to an action on the contract. 
[3] !d.-Agreements to Arbitrate-Rescission.-There may be a 
mutual rescission of an arbitration provision of a contract. 
[4] !d.-Agreements to Arbitrate-Rescission.-Where a collec-
tive between local unions and an em-
for dismissal pay and for 
arbitration of disputes provided that the employer would not 
be liable for dismissal pay if an employee was dismissed 
"for any other cause or causes beyond the control of the pro-
ducer," and a dispute subsequently arose between the em-
ployer and the unions as to whether the employer was liable 
under such provision for dismissal pay to employees dismissed 
as a result of the employer's closing its plant, affidavits show-
repeated refusals by one local union to arbitrate the dis-
pute and a repudiation of the arbitration provision and 
acceptance thereof by the employer could support a conclusion 
that there was a mutual rescission of the provision for arbi-
tration. 
[5] Contracts-Performance- Excuses for Nonperformance.-A 
repudiation of a contract accepted by the promisor excuses 
performance by the promisee. (Civ. Code, § 1511.) 
[6] Id.-Abandonment.-An abandonment of a contract may be 
implied from acts of the parties, and this may be accomplished 
by repudiation of the contract by one party and acquiescence 
of the other in such repudiation. 
[7] Arbitration-Agreements to Arbitrate.-Assuming the right to 
enforce provisions of Lab. Code, § 222, relating to withholding 
part of wages established by collective bargaining, cannot 
be and is not waived by an arbitration provision, a person's 
conduct in pursuing the remedy provided for under that code 
section is some evidence that he does not intend to arbitrate. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County dismissing a proceeding for an order direct-
ing arbitration. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmed. 
Joseph W. Fairfield and Ethelyn F. Black for Appellant. 
Pauline Nightingale and Leon H. Berger as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellant. 
Irving A. Bernstein for Respondent. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 229; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 381 
et seq. 
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CARTER, J.-Pursuant to the con-
arbitration (Code Civ. 1280-1293), Aller, 
petitioner, the business of a union, Local 659, 
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and 
Moving Picture Machine Operators (by stipulation the union 
was substituted as in place of Aller), filed against 
defendant, Color Corporation of America, a corporation 
inafter referred to as Color), asking that Color be required 
to arbitrate a dispute under a collective bargaining agreement. 
Defendant answered, its main claim being that petitioner 
had lost its right to have the arbitration provision in the 
collective bargaining agreement enforced because it had repu-
diated and waived it. After hearing on the petition, the 
court gave judgment dismissing the proceeding and awarding 
costs to defendant. Petitioner appeals. 
It is not disputed, and the court found, that Color, engaged 
in the film processing business, had collective bargaining 
agreements with five other unions in addition to petitioner 
and all contracts contained the same arbitration clause. The 
clause provided three steps in grievance procedure for settling 
disputes with regard to wages, hours or other conditions of 
employment, and the interpretation of the agreement, the 
first two being an attempt by representatives of Color, the 
employer, and the unions to settle the dispute. Failing settle-
ment, the third provides for the appointment of an arbitrator 
by the parties within 10 days thereafter to settle it. Either 
party may proceed under the arbitration clause. Any griev-
<mce for the payment of dismissal pay not presented under 
the first step shall be deemed waived unless presented 365 
days after the employee becomes entitled to such pay. Under 
the collective bargaining agreements employees are entitled 
to ''dismissal pay'' but the employer is not liable therefor if 
the employee was dismissed ''for any other cause or causes 
beyond the control of the" employer, Color. In 1954, Color 
closed its plant and dismissed all of its employees, including 
Krog, Ragin and Moore who were members of petitioner, 
Local 659. In August, 1954, a dispute arose between Color 
and the unions as to whether the dismissed union employees 
should receive dismissal pay inasmuch as Color claimed that 
under the bargaining agreement the dismissals were for causes 
beyond their control and the union contending otherwise. All 
of the unions except petitioner, Local 659, and defendant pro-
ceeded with the grievance and arbitration procedure and those 
the other unions were refused by 
failed and refused to comply with 
and instead elected to and did bring 
proceedings before the state labor com-
missioner to collect dismissal pay. 
Petitioner argues that under the law it could not lose its 
right to have the arbitration provision enforced and under 
the faets, as a matter of it did not. Defendant urges that 
petitioner lost his right to arbitration and the evidence sup-
ports the trial eourt 's in this respect. No question 
is raised as to whether the here involved was sub-
ject to arbitration under the arbitration statute and the 
eollecti ve bargaining contract. 
'l'he evidence on the subject is by affidavit and letters. In 
an affidavit by Bernstein, eounsel for Color, offered by Color, 
it is stated: That on August 5th and 12th, 1954, he explained 
defendant's position on the dispute to petitioner's represen-
tatives, that is, that it was not liable for dismissal pay. On 
the 18th, it agreed with rounsel for the unions other than 
petitioner, that grievance and arbitration procedure was 
necessary; on August he was advised that the labor 
commissioner had issued an order (dated August 19th) to 
appear before him on a eharge by petitioner that defendant 
was invoking section 222 of the !Jabor Code,* that he ex-
plained the arbitration provision to the commissioner; that on 
September 2d he met with the commissioner and petitioner's 
representative Nave and asked Nave to dismiss the complaint 
before the commissioner and arbitrate under the bargaining 
agreement but Nave refused; that after some correspondence 
with the commissioner, Stone, defendant's vice president, on 
'It shall be unlawful, in case of any wage arrived at 
through eollec.tive bargaining, either wilfully or or with intent 
to defraud an employee, a competitor, or any other person, to withhold 
from said employee any of the wage agreed upon.'' (Lab. Code, 
9 222.) A violation of section is a misdemeanor. (ld., § 225.) 
LOUAL 659, LA.T.S.E. v. COLOR CORP. ANIER. 193 
C.2d 189; 302 P.2d 2941 
~~opy to petitioner) 
and : "By this 
J;oeal 659 [petitioner], 
are requiring us to defend onr position in court in the 
of the fact that our bargaining agreement provides other-
\Ve intend to llold both ~-ou and Local 659 fully re-
for all consequences resulting from this ill-advised 
action" that on September 29th petitioner wrote to Stone 
: "Our dispute with you is not a matter of interpreta-
tion but one of non-payment and we are prepared to show that 
yon have wilfully refused to .make such payment and that 
were not compelled to go out of business, as you claimed 
:von \Wre in the defense raised in the arbitration proceeding. 
Even that is not a good defense in the current hearing with 
the other unions, but since they haYe elected to take the other 
course, that is their problem. The best way to settle this 
matter is to let everyone testify under oath and I would 
ee1·tainly expeet you to be very willing to aeeept this judicial 
proeess of settling disputes. After all, when one is under 
oath, the truth and only the truth will prevail"; that on 
September 27th the eommission advised defendant that peti-
tioner insisted on eriminal proeeedings and the matter will 
be referred to the "eity attorney." Stone's affidavit, offered 
defendant, stated that he had a "great many telephone 
eonversations" with Aller before and after ,January 11, 1955, 
and prior to Aller's letter of September 29th, 1954. he made 
' repeated demands" upon Aller that I1oeal 659 abide by the 
terms of the bargaining and arbitrate the dispute; that 
after the reeeipt of that letter "and in every subsequent con-
versation, I informed Mr. Aller that the Company con-
sidered his ta('ties in this whole matter to be reprehensible, 
that the Company f defendant 1 ehose to eonsider those tacties 
and his unequivoeal refusal to arbitrate as a repudiation and 
breach of the eontraet, and that the Company would no longer 
eonsent to an arbitration''; he ackno\vledged receiving the 
letters AJler mentions in his affidavit but rlenies the agree-
ment mentioned by Aller. 
Aller in his affidavit on behalf of petitioner stated he denied 
Local 659 had evrr refused to arbitrate the dispute but de-
fendant refused to cooperate and he and Stone agreed to 
''hold in abeyanee'' all disputes until one of the other union's 
(Loeal 683) arbitration had been completed; he refers to 
lett01·s he says he sent to Stone during January, March and 
47 C.2d-7 
CoLOR CoRP. A:.rER. C.2d 
uco>.Ll<LLlUJLHt> arbitration inasmuch as the arbitra~ 
tion with Local 683 had been favorable that union. 
The question thus whether or not there has 
been a mutual or 
estoppel by or on behalf of in the enforcement of 
the arbitration clause. We are not concerned here with any 
question involving the or violation of the terms 
of the bargaining agreement other than the arbitration pro-
vision. (See conflict of authorities on that subject: 3 A.L.R 
2d 383.) [1] Section 1280 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
provides that a provision in a written contract to settle by 
arbitration a controversy arising out of the contract or the 
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof ''shall be 
valid, enforcible and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in eqttity for the revocation of any contract" 
(emphasis added). It is thus indicated that there may be 
instances in which the right to enforce an arbitration pro-
vision is lost. This is further shown by other provisions. 
A party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of another to per-
form under a contract providing for arbitration may have 
the provision enforced by the court; the court shall hear the 
matter and on being satisfied the failure to comply with the 
arbitration ''is not in issue'' shall order the arbitration to 
proceed; if "default" be in issue, that shall be tried. (I d., 
§ 1282.) If any action be brought on the issue arising out 
of the contract for arbitration the court shall stay the action 
upon being satisfied that the issue is referable to arbitration 
provided the ''applicant for the stay is not in default in pro-
ceeding with" the arbitration. (Id., § 1284.) It is also evident 
that defendant could have proceeded to enforce the provision 
for arbitration under the code when petitioner refused to 
arbitrate. 
[2] Iu harmony with the arbitration statute, supra, it 
has been held that the arbitration provision of a contract 
may be waived by either or both of the parties by litigating 
the dispute which would be arbitrable under the provision 
and not raising the question of the arbitration provision 
(Case v. Kadota Fig Assn., 35 Cal.2d 596 [220 P.2d 912]; 
Trnbowitch v. Rivm·bank Canning Co., 30 Cal.2d 335 [182 
P.2d 182] ; Jones v. Pollock, 34 Cal.2d 863 [215 P.2d 733] ; 
Landreth v. Sotdh Coast Rock Co., 136 Cal.App. 457 [29 
P.2d 225]; Pierce v. Wright, 117 Cal.App.2d 718 [256 P.2d 
1049] ; Fejer v. Paonessa, 104 Cal.App.2d 190 [231 P.2d 
507] ; Wilson v. Mattei, 84 Cal.App. 567 [258 P. 453] ; 161 
Oct. CoLOR CoRP. AMER. 195 
C.2d 189; 302 P.2d 294] 
302 see Dept. Inc. v. 
320 [252 P.2d 418]) that a 
failure by a party to proceed to arbitrate in the manner and 
at the time provided in the arbitration provision is a waiver 
of the right to insist on arbitration as a defense to an action 
on the contract. Pneucrete v. United States Fid. 
& Guar. 7 Cal.App.2d 733 [ 46 P.2d 1000] ; Jordan v. 
f1'rt<9am~an. 72 Cal.App.2d 726 [165 P.2d 728]; see 117 A.L.R. 
302; 161 1426.) [3] There may be a mutual rescission 
Drake v. Stein, 116 Cal.App.2d 779 [254 P.2d 613]). It 
has been said: ''In the light of present-day arbitration statutes, 
most agreements to arbitrate future disputes are likely to be 
held to be lawful and valid; and under such statutes the 
courts may stay proceedings at law and order the arbitration 
to go forward. When one of the parties is resisting such an 
order, the court must make two principal determinations be-
fore issuing it. First was a valid agreement to arbitrate ever 
made by the parties and is it still operative 1 Secondly, does 
the dispute that now exists fall within the terms of that agree-
ment, reasonably interpreted 1 In the present action we 
are dealing only with the former of these questions. 
'. . . the arbitration agreement . . . if lawful, may have 
been rescinded, repudiated, or avoided. The parties to such 
an agreement have power to rescind it by mutual agreement 
to that effect. The ordinary arbitration statutes do not de-
prive them of this power. The parties may, however, re-
scind other agreements that they have made, without intending 
to affect their agreement to arbitrate disputes. The agree-
ment to arbitrate may be wholly separate from other trans-
actions; or, although contained in a single written instrument 
with other provisions, it may be wholly independent of them-
separate and collateral agreement. 
"Although one party can not by himself 'rescind' a con-
he can wrongfully 'repudiate' it. What is the effect 
of his repudiation T To answer this, we must first interpret 
his expressions and determine the coverage of the repudiation. 
Suppose :first that he repudiates the agreement to arbitrate 
itself. By such a repudiation he does not deprive the other 
of his right to arbitration; and if the repudiator brings 
action in breach of his valid arbitration agreement the 
defendant can defend on the ground that arbitration is a 
condition precedent, or under a statute can obtain a stay 
an order to arbitrate, or can counterclaim for damages. 
196 C.2d 
But such a no 
The other can now his action in reliance on the 
repudiation, or otherwise change his position in reliance. 
Thereafter, the repudiator has no power of retraction and can 
not insist on the remedy by arbitration .... 
"In determining whether repudiation or other vital 
breach of a contract should a of his right to 
an arbitration of the existing dispute, the court should con-
sider the form and extent of the repudiation or breach and 
the reasons for which it occurred. A repudiation that clearly 
includes the arbitration provision itself should prevent the 
repudiator from using it in defense when sued in the courts. 
If the provision is not itself repudiated and the issue that is 
raised by the alleged breach is one that is within the coverage 
of the provision, the defendant should be supported in in-
sisting on arbitration of the issue unless his bad faith and 
wilful misconduct are sufficiently obvious to justify a dis-
cretionary refusal of such support.'' (Corbin on Contracts, 
§ 1443.) In Tas-T-Ntd Co. v. Continental Nnt Co., 125 Cal. 
App.2d 351, 354 [270 P.2d 43], the court, while holding the 
evidence insufficient to show a waiver or repudiation of an 
arbitration provision, proceed~d to discuss applicable prin-
ciples. It said: ". . . it has often been held the right to 
arbitrate can be waived [citations 1, and that whether or not 
waiver has taken place is ordinarily a question of fact, yet 
we are compelled to hold upon the record here that there is 
no support for the trial court's finding that the appellant 
had ever waived the provision of the contract binding the 
parties to proceed in arbitration if controversies arose be-
tween them. The right to arbitrate is of course possessed by 
each party to the agreement and notwithstanding one party 
may impede the normal course of arbitration such conduct 
cannot dispense with the right of the other party to compel 
it. Our statute affords complete remedies to implement and 
to specifically enforce this right. If, therefore, one party 
to an arbitration agreement has by dilatory tactics or an 
express refusal to proceed with arbitration placed himself in 
such a position that the other party could accede to the 
abandonment of the arbitration elause, yet such party need 
not do so .... Bnt this is an election whieh it must make 
fm· it eannot lH~ep alive in itst>lf the to arbitrate and 
at the Rame time deny it to its (Krauss Bros. 
Lln·. Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons .. 62 F.2d 1004, 1006.) Said 
the court as to one party to an arbitration agreement who 
197 
action in a state 
action was indeed a of the 
to arbitrate it gave the defendant 
the plaintiff at its word, to put an end to 
arbitration or to insist upon By 
in the answer it chose the second course .... It is 
true that did not follow this up .by selecting an arbitrator 
as it had to do. Until it did, it was therefore not 
in position to of the action under section 
5 of the New York Arbitration Aet ... and delay to do so 
might indeed forfeit its recourse to that remedy .... But, 
so far as concerned the plaintiff's repudiation, it had ehosen 
not to call off the clause, not to "rescind" it; and it could 
not prevent the plaintiff's resumption of the remedy, while 
its own position remained unchanged.' 
"The above holding by the federal eourt is no more than 
an application of the familiar rule that if an agreement be 
breached the party against whom the breaeh is committed 
may refuse to accept the breaeh or terminate the eontract, 
thus keeping the eontract alive, but that if he does so he 
keeps it alive both for the benefit of himself and for that 
of the other contracting party. (Williston on Contraets, rev. 
ed., § 684; Alder v. Drndis, 30 Cal.2d 372, 381 [182 P.2d 
195].)" 
[4] In the instant case it appears that the dispute under 
the collective bargaining agreement arose in August, 1954 
between petitioner and all the other unions and the other 
unions commenced the grievance and arbitration procedure. 
Petitioner however, refused to participate. 'l'he dispute with 
all the unions was exactly the same, whether dismissal pay 
was to be paid under the eontract. In the same month peti-
tioner complained to the state labor commissioner that pay 
(dismissal pay) was being withheld contrary to section 222 
of the Labor Code, supra, and the eommissioner issued his 
order for a hearing on that subject. On September 29th 
petitioner, by Aller, wrote the letter to defendant heretofore 
quoted and it was in response to a demand that petitioner 
arbitrate. While not too clear, that letter is readily suscep-
tible of the construction that petitioner did not wish to arbi-
trate but preferred to proceed before the labor commissioner. 
any case, Stone's affidavit shows that defendant's repeated 
demands on petitioner, both before and after the letter, that 
of the arbitration pro-
vision and refusal to arbitrate was hreaeh of the eontract 
and defendant would ''no eon sent'' to arbitration. 
There some eonflict on the matter reason of Aller's 
affidavit but the resolution of eonfliet was for the trial 
l:ourL Even if the letter did not eonstitute an 
refusal to Stone's affidaYit shows other nne>nn"m" 
r0fnsals and defendant's thereof. :B"'or the same 
reason it is not necessary to eonsider the before 
the labor eommissioner; there is sufficient without it. Aller 
in his letters to Stone of and thereafter in-
dicated a desire to arbitrate, but we take it from Bernstein's 
and Stone's afiidaYits that there had before then been a 
repudiation of the arbitration provision and acceptance there-
of by defendant. Indeed, it may well be concluded from 
those affidavits that there was a mutual rescission of the pro-
vision for arbitration. 
[5] A repudiation of a eontract aerepted by the promisor 
excuses performance by the promisee. (Bomberger v. Mc-
Kelvey, 35 Cal.2d 607 [220 P.2d 729]; Walker v. Harbor 
Business Blocks Co., 181 Cal. 773 [186 P. 356]; Civ. Code, 
§ 1511.) [6] And it is said in DesseTt Seed Co. v. Garb~ts, 
66 Cal.App.2d 838, 847 [153 P.2d 184]: "It is well settled 
that an abandonment of a contract may be implied from the 
aets of the parties and this may be accomplished by the 
repudiation of the eontraet by one of the parties and by the 
acquieseenee of the other party in sueh repudiation. This 
doctrine is supported by many eases. [Citations.] 
"In support of the court's :findings and judgment, the 
evidence would warrant a conclusion that there had been a 
mutual abandonment or rescission of the oral contract." 
Amicus curiaeq.' contends on behalf of petitioner on peti-
tion for hearing in this court that the proceeding by petitioner 
before the labor commissioner and the steps for enforcement 
by the commissioner of section 222 of the Labor Code, supra, 
cannot be considered as an election of remedies by petitioner 
as it would mean that the arbitration provisions would control 
over that section and the policy thereby established by the 
Ijegislature relying upon Pnetterete Corp. v. Un£ted States 
Fid. & Gnar. Co., 7 Cal.App.2d 733 [ 46 P.2d 10001, and 
Wallace v. Carpenters Local Union, 137 Cal.App.2d 468 
*The State Labor Commissioner. 
I.A.T.S.E. v. CoLOR CoRP. AMER. 199 
C.2d 189; 302 P.2d 294] 
the Pneucrete ease the court deelared 
that au aetion would lie on a materialman's bond given by 
the contractor as required by statute when there was a con-
struction contract between the contractor and a flood control 
district, even though there was an arbitration provision in 
the construction contract because the bond was by 
statute and to allow arbitration to prevent an action thereon 
would frustrate the requiring the bond. In the 
Wallace case it was held that the employer could obtain an 
injunction authorized by the law jurisdictional strikes 
(I1ab. Code, §§ 1115-1120) even though there was an arbitra-
tion clause in the collective bargaining agreement. It is un-
necessary to pass upon that point, however, because the judg-
ment is otherwise supportable as seen from the foregoing 
discussion. Moreover, we see no frustration in the policy 
declared in section 222 in treating a proceeding thereunder 
as some indication that petitioner was abandoning or re-
pudiating the arbitration provision. 
[7] Assuming the right to enforce the provisions of sec-
tion 222 cannot be and is not waived by an arbitration pro-
vision, a person's conduct in pursuing the remedy provided 
for under this section is some evidence that he does not intend 
to arbitrate. \Vhat the labor commissioner or a prosecuting 
attorney may or may not do in enforcing the section has no 
bearing on the arbitration provision, but what the party to 
the contract containing the arbitration clause does, may throw 
some light on his intention. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
